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Abstract
We estimate the macroeconomic e¤ects of public wage expenditures in U.S. data by
identifying shocks to public employment and public wages using sign restrictions. We
nd that public employment shocks are mildly expansionary at the federal level and
strongly expansionary at the state and local level by crowding in private consumption
and increasing labor force participation and private sector employment. Similarly, state
and local government wage shocks lead to increases in consumption and output, while
shocks to federal government wages induce signicant contractionary e¤ects. In a stylized
DSGE model we show that the degree of complementarity between public and private
goods in the consumption bundle is key for explaining the observed heterogeneity.
JEL classi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1 Introduction
The last nancial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession still take their toll on many ad-
vanced economies. They have posed a serious threat on output and the labor markets, leading
to an unusually slow recovery. This fact has revived the debate on the e¤ectiveness of discre-
tionary scal policy as a tool to stimulate private activity, establish sustainable growth and
recover lost jobs. Another relevant question that naturally arises in this context is which scal
instruments are the most e¤ective for fueling economic activity.
Most of the empirical VAR literature on the macroeconomics of scal policy does not distin-
guish between di¤erent types of government spending, and treats total government spending as
a single scal instrument. Needless to say, not all types of government spending are expected
to induce the same e¤ects on the macroeconomy. Furthermore, most of the literature interprets
the empirical e¤ects of this total government spending instrument as if they were the result of
changes in government consumption of goods and services. However, government spending is
not only consumption of goods and services. Wage and salary payments account for a large
share of public expenditure in the U.S. During the postwar period, government wage and salary
expenditure has accounted for about 50% of government expenditure (See Figure 1(b)). In the
aftermath of the Great Recession, concern about the government budget has focused greater
attention on the costs that the government incurs to compensate its employees.
Given the weight of wage expenditures in total government spending, the purpose of this
paper is to estimate the e¤ects of public wage bill policies on output and the labor market of the
private sector, and draw policy implications that could be useful in the aftermath of the crisis.
Using U.S. data over the period 1979-2007, we identify exogenous shocks to public employment
and public wages. Following Mountford and Uhlig (2009), we adopt an agnostic identication
that sets a minimum set of sign restrictions to the scal shocks identied. In particular, we
identify shocks to government employment that raise government employment for four quarters
and shocks to government wages that induce an increase in the average hourly wage rate for
four quarters after the shock. We also ensure that the identied shocks to the government wage
bill are orthogonal to business cycle, monetary policy, and government revenue shocks.
In a spirit similar to Ramey (2012), we ask whether the two shocks di¤er in their ability
to stimulate private activity, raising employment and lowering unemployment. Our ndings
indicate that the e¤ects of government employment shocks are clearly expansionary at the state
and local (S&L henceforth) level, and only mildly expansionary at the federal level, while shocks
to the government wage rate can be contractionary at the federal level and expansionary at the
2
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S&L level. Shocks to S&L government wages and employment lead to a crowd in of private
consumption, while shocks to federal government wages lead to public-private wage spillovers,
inducing a negative labor demand e¤ect, a sharp fall in private sector employment and an
increase in unemployment.
The existing literature is silent about the e¤ects of shocks to the government wage bill on
private economic activity. Apart from Linnemann (2009) that has demonstrated in aggregate
U.S. time series that increases in government employment generate positive responses of private
employment and real output and a short-lived expansion in private consumption, and Pappa
(2009) that has reported mixed results for the employment response to government employment
shocks using annual U.S. state and aggregate data over the period 1969-2001, very few papers
study the e¤ects of changes in the government wage bill. Moreover, we expand the existing
literature by (i) disentangling the e¤ects of shocks to both public employment and public wages;
(ii) disaggregating the e¤ects by government level; (iii) examining the e¤ects on the labor force
participation and unemployment rates.
In order to explain the empirical ndings, we develop a Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium (DSGE) model with sticky prices augmented with public good production, allowing for
both productive and utility-enhancing services for the public good, search and matching fric-
tions, and endogenous labor force participation Our theoretical model matches qualitatively
the empirical evidence for all shocks considered in the empirical exercise. More specically,
public employment shocks are expansionary by crowding in private consumption and increas-
ing labor force participation and employment in the private sector. In the standard neoclassical
growth model, increases in public employment should reduce private consumption and private
employment as the additional labor supply spurred by the scal shocks negative income e¤ect
is entirely absorbed by the public sector (see Finn (1998)). We show that the complemen-
tarity of the public good with private consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle of
the household can overturn the negative wealth e¤ect of the shock and lead to an increase in
private consumption. Our ndings conrm, in a di¤erent framework, the results of Linnemann
(2009) who shows that if public services are complementary to private consumption goods in
the households utility function, an increase in public employment raises private consumption
and private sector employment.1 Also in a similar framework to ours, Forni et al. (2009)
demonstrate that shocks to public employment can lead to increases in private consumption
1This mechanism when combined with mild increasing returns and variable capacity utilization is shown
to also explain initially positive (though later on negative) responses of investment and real wages to public
employment shocks that seem to be consistent with Linnemanns (2009) empirical evidence.
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in a model with rule of thumb consumers.2 In their model, there is also a positive covaria-
tion between public and private employment, since the additional consumption demand makes
private sector rms, which are demand constrained, expand their labor input to meet the in-
crease in aggregate demand. Here, we study the e¤ects of both public employment and public
wage shocks and provide an alternative mechanism which rests on the complementarity channel
rather than liquidity constrained households, and it is able to explain the transmission of both
types of shocks.
Our model also explains how government wage shocks can be contractionary or expansion-
ary at the di¤erent government levels. More specically, wage shocks lead to public-private
wage spillovers, inducing a negative labor demand e¤ect, a sharp fall in private employment,
and an increase in unemployment. At the same time, they can lead to a crowd in of private
consumption given the complementarity of the latter with the public good in the aggregate
consumption bundle of the household. These two opposite channels can help explain the em-
pirical results. For su¢ciently high degree of complementarity between the public good and
private consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle, our model predicts positive e¤ects
of government wage shocks on private activity, as found for S&L government wages in the data.
On the other hand, when the complementarity channel is weaker, the wage spillover e¤ect in the
private sector dominates, leading to a substantial fall in private employment and a short-run
contraction in private activity. To examine the sensitivity of our conclusions, we perform a sort
of prior predictive analysis (see e.g., Leeper et al. (2015)). The analysis reports the probability
distribution of impulse responses that the model can produce. The model with low degree
of complementarity between public and private goods can generate negative output responses
for government wage shocks and small multipliers for government employment shocks, while
for strong complementarity between the private and the public goods the model can generate
positive responses for wage shocks and higher multipliers for employment shocks. We conclude
that the degree of complementarity between private and public goods is key for explaining the
observed heterogeneity of responses in the di¤erent government levels.
Our analysis therefore suggests that the public good provided at the federal level may ex-
hibit a di¤erent degree of complementarity with private consumption than that at S&L level.
2The response of private consumption following total government spending shocks has received much at-
tention in the literature. Deep habits or rule-of-thumb consumers have been shown to generate consumption
crowding in (e.g., Ravn et al., 2006 and Gali et al., 2007), whereas another class of models includes government
investment as part of the production function (Leeper et al., 2010, Drautzburg and Uhlig, 2015). Monacelli et
al. (2010) show that a combination of consumption-leisure complementarity in households preferences and New
Keynesian features can generate consumption crowding in a model with search and matching frictions.
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This might be justied by the di¤erent nature of the public good provided in each case. For
instance, federal government employees largely comprise military and defense employees, while
S&L government employees provide mainly education, health care and transportation services.
Research by Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) using European data has indeed shown that the
degree of complementarity between government and private consumption is not homogeneous
over types of public expenditures. In particular, merit goods, including health and education,
complement private consumption, while public goods, referring to defense, public order and
justice, are substitutes with private consumption. This idea is in line with recent work by
Perotti (2014) who shows that defense spending shocks in a SVAR generate contractionary re-
sponses, while civilian government spending shocks generate large expansionary responses. The
theoretical explanation provided in that paper is based on the assumption that civilian spend-
ing exhibits Edgeworth complementarity with private consumption, while defense spending is
not utility enhancing. In a similar vein, Pieroni and Lorusso (2015) present VAR estimates
for the U.S. economy showing that civilian expenditure induces a positive response of private
consumption, whereas military spending has a negative impact. Our results square well also
with the evidence presented in Bouakez and Rebei (2007) who, using a maximum-likelihood
estimation with U.S. data, nd a strong Edgeworth complementarity between the two types
of consumption goods. Also, Fève et al. (2013) show that government spending multipliers
obtained in the literature may be downward biased because the standard approach does not al-
low for complementarities between private consumption and government spending in the utility
function.
Our work has a number of useful policy implications in the aftermath of the crisis and
the slow recovery in advanced countries. In particular, increases in public employment can
stimulate the private sectors employment, encourage labor force participation and private
demand. On the other hand, public wage policies could be expansionary only if the increases
in wages are associated with the production of those public goods that strongly complement
private consumption. Wage increases should target, for instance, employees that work in public
education or the public health system.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the data on the U.S.
government wage bill and public employment, the estimated VAR model and empirical ndings.
Section 3 presents our theoretical model which matches qualitatively the empirical evidence.
Finally, Section 4 concludes.
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2 Empirical analysis
2.1 Data
As shown in Figure 1(a), since the 1970s public wage expenditures have accounted for around
50% on average of government expenditures in the U.S. and around 5% of GDP. Although the
literature has looked extensively at the macroeconomic e¤ects of certain components of U.S.
government spending, such as public investment, research on the e¤ects of the public wage
bill has been surprisingly limited, despite the fact that it represents the largest component of
spending, as shown in Figure 1(b). Looking at a decomposition of public wage expenditures by
government level, we see a shift over time towards states and localities, with the federal share
amounting to between 20% and 30% from the 2000s (Figure 1(c)). In 1980, federal civilian
employees made up 2.3% of the workforce, while they accounted for 1.7% of the workforce
in 2010 ((Falk (2012)). According to the same authors, for the past 30 years, the number of
civilians employed by the federal government has uctuated around 2 million people. Besides
federal civilian workers, the armed services include steadily more than 2 million uniformed
personnel.
In order to take a view of the variation in the government wage bill, in Figure 2 we plot
the quarterly growth changes in the two basic components of the wage bill: government em-
ployment and the average real hourly wage in the public sector. Government employment is
dened as the number of government employees per capita, including both civilian and military
employees. Data on civilian employees comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, while the
military employees series is constructed by Ramey (2011). The average real hourly wage is
constructed using the NBER extracts of the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups. We con-
struct quarterly series for hourly wages at the federal and the S&L government level, and also
for the private sector, by regressing for the repeated (monthly) cross section the log of hourly
wage  separately for each of the two categories  on socio-demographic variables (age group,
gender, race, and marital status) and dummies for each state in order to adjust for worker
quality and composition of the workforce. Monthly residuals are transformed to quarterly ob-
servations using the mid-quarter residuals estimates and are de-seasoned and deated using the
GDP deator series. We exclude from the sample workers that have never been employed full
time and self-employed individuals.3
3Ideally, we would have liked also to control for educational attainment. However, there is a break in the
educational attainment series between December 1991 and January 1992 because of the revised questionnaire
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As can be readily seen, the various scal episodes (i.e. unusually large changes in the spend-
ing components) are not correlated. Those scal episodes can be related to several policy
episodes in history. In particular, the data point to a signicant increase in federal employ-
ment in 1990, when President Bush increased government employment for defense in the face
of the German reunication, and to a fall in public employment in 1980, after Reagan won the
presidential election and cut the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1974. The
series of hourly wage changes track well the amendments of the Minimum Wage Rates Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938-2009.4 According to the U.S. department of Labor, in 1990
a minimum wage increase occurred for all covered, nonexempt workers. The Minimum Wage
Rates Under the Fair Labor Standards Acts of 1996 and 1997 increased the minimum wage for
all covered, nonexempt workers. The signicant change in government wages observed in 2007
could be related to the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007, a U.S. Act of Congress that amended
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to gradually raise the federal minimum wage from $5.15
per hour to $5.85 per hour. When we compare the series at the federal and the S&L level,
many striking di¤erences in the employment and wage growth series emerge. For example, the
increases in federal employment in 1990, and again in 2000, were accompanied by a fall in S&L
employment at the same time period. For the wage series, we observe a big fall in the growth
rate of hourly wages at the federal level in 1997, while, on the other hand, we observe a big
surge of S&L government wages after 1985 and in 2007, with federal wage growth being around
the trend in this period.
2.2 The VAR model
In this subsection, we formalize the econometric framework in order to estimate the short-run
e¤ects of public employment and wage shocks on private activity. We consider a VAR model
of eleven endogenous variables. We rst include the four main items of government spending:
the log of government employment per capita, the log of average real hourly public wage,
the log of real per capita government expenditure in goods purchases, dened as government
consumption minus compensation of government employees, and the log of real per capita
gross xed investment. The second set of seven variables included in the VAR are: the log of
real per capita net (of transfers) tax revenue, the log of real per capita private GDP, private
and we were not able to harmonize the data. Also, we would have preferred to deate using state-level data on
GSP deators, but we were constrained to use aggregate GDP deator series due to data availability.
4See U.S. Department of Labor: History of Federal Minimum Wage Rates Under the Fair Labor Standards
Act at https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm.
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consumption and private investment, the ination rate, a measure of short-term interest rate
and a labor market variable. The latter alternates between (i) the log of private employment
per capita, (ii) the real private wage rate, (iii) the unemployment rate, and (iv) the labor
force participation rate. Finally, we include in the VAR an exogenous war dummy variable
with several lags to control for strong anticipation e¤ects (see Ramey (2011)). Following Uhlig
(1994) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009), we do not include any constant or time trend.5
The type and number of variables included in the VAR is mainly dictated by the identica-
tion scheme we use in order to identify government employment and wage shocks, as described
in the next subsection. The fact that we seek to uncover the e¤ects of scal shocks on the
private economy is another reason that orientated us towards considering private sectors mea-
sures of most variables. The output variable, for instance, refers to an approximation of the
value added produced by the private sector, which equals total GDP net of the government
wage bill (according to the denition of Private Sector Production in Ramey (2012), Figure
1). The exclusion of the government wage bill also allows us to isolate the second-round e¤ects
of public wage expenditures on output, net of the direct impact of the public wage bill on GDP.
According to information criteria, we set the lag length of the VAR to two. Following
Uhlig (2005), we carry out a Bayesian estimation using at priors on the coe¢cients of the
model and the covariance matrix of the shocks (see Appendix B). We use quarterly, seasonally
adjusted data for the U.S. from 1979 to 2007. The starting period is mainly dictated by the
availability of the public wage series, while the sample stops in 2007 in order for our results not
to be biased from extraordinary economic conditions (e.g. interest rates close to the zero lower
bound, nancial crisis etc.). We estimate the e¤ects of spending policies by government level:
federal and S&L. Hence, the VAR exercise is repeated twice, using government expenditure
series for each government level. The series come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and other sources. A detailed description of the data is provided in
Appendix A.
2.3 Identifying the shocks
We base the identication of the scal shocks on the sign restriction approach (Arias et al.
(2014), Canova and Pappa (2007), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Pappa (2009), Uhlig (2005)).
5As the authors discuss, this is important to obtain more robust results because of the interdependencies in
the specication of the prior between these terms and the roots in the autoregressive coe¢cients. However, we
have also estimated a VAR including a constant and a quadratic trend. The results remain qualitatively robust
and are available in the online Appendix.
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The use of sign restrictions avoids, in principle, typical problems associated with the identica-
tion of economically meaningful scal shocks. In particular, problems concerning the scarceness
of reasonable zero-identifying restrictions are to a large extent avoided. Hence, we opt for an
agnostic identication that sets a minimum set of sign restrictions on the responses to the scal
shocks and, at the same time, controlling for the business cycle or other macroeconomic shocks.
Similarly to Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Arias et al. (2014), we perform a sequential
shock identication. We rst identify a generic business cycle shock that implies a positive co-
movement of output, private consumption, private investment and government revenue for four
quarters k = 0, 1, 2, 3. According to some methodological advances in the empirical literature
(Arias et al. (2015)), we identify a monetary policy shock by imposing two sets of restrictions
on the structural representation coe¢cients of the interest rate equation, which can be thought
as an approximated Taylor rule equation. In particular, we require that (i) the federal funds
rate is the monetary policy instrument and it only reacts contemporaneously to output and
prices, and (ii) the contemporaneous reaction of the federal funds rate to output and ination
is nonnegative.6 We also require the monetary policy shock to be orthogonal to the business
cycle shock.
After identifying the business cycle and monetary policy shock, we turn to the identication
of the scal shocks. In particular, we recover sequentially a government revenue shock, a
government investment shock, a government (non-wage) consumption shock, a government
wage shock, and a government employment shock. All scal shocks are identied by requiring
that (i) they are orthogonal to the business cycle, the monetary policy and the rest scal shocks,
and (ii) the respective scal instrument increases for quarters k = 0, 1, 2, 3 after the shock.7
For imposing both zero and sign restrictions we apply the methodology of Arias et al. (2014).
This is the most appropriate for our aim for two reasons; rstly, it o¤ers a faster procedure
of identifying shocks using both zero and sign restrictions comparably to other methodologies;
secondly, other sign restriction methodologies implicitly rely on conditionally agnostic priors
(not trully agnostic priors), something avoided by the present approach (for detailed discussion
see Arias et al. (2014)).
The sign restrictions are summarized in Table 1, while the identication algorithm is detailed
6In a subsequent study (Arias et al. (2016)) the authors discuss the risk of using both sign and zero
restrictions to get conditionally agnostic priors. To check whether our analysis draws safe results we have also
estimated impulse responses based on an identication of the monetary policy shock without zero restrictions
(Uhlig (2005)). The results of this robustness exercise are qualitatively similar and available upon request.
7We have experimented with di¤erent number of restricted horizons from 1 to 4 periods. Since the implica-
tions of the analysis are similar and in order to follow the existing literature (Mountford and Uhlig (2009)), we
use an horizon of four quarters as benchmark. Sensitivity analysis results are available upon request.
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in Appendix C. The estimation of the VAR and the identication of shocks are based on N=500
draws from the posterior distribution of the VAR parameters and M=3000 draws of orthonormal
matrices.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 The identied shocks to the government wage bill
Following the strategy outlined in the previous section, we identify shock series for government
wages and employment at the federal and the S&L level. Figure 3 displays the median and the
68% condence bands of the two structural shocks calculated from the VAR residuals at the
di¤erent government levels. The values in the vertical axes correspond to standard deviations.
It can be easily seen that the volatility of the shocks at the di¤erent government level is of similar
magnitude. Notice that the peaks of the series at each government level do not coincide. For
example, we observe a surge in federal government employment in 1990 and 2000, while S&L
public employment is, if anything, increasing slightly in the 1990s and falls signicantly in 2000.
The fall in government employment around 1983 reects cuts in the Reagan presidency era. The
1982 scal budget that was proposed by Reagan represented indeed a reduction of $44 billion,
or 5.7%, and all categories of public employment, except national defense, were reduced. Over
half of the $44 billion budget reduction came from two areas: income security; and education,
training employment and social services that seemed to have a¤ected more severely the S&L
governments.
Big wage cuts occur in 1985, 1990 and 2001 at the S&L level, while in 1996 at the federal
level. It seems that the cuts in public wages at the S&L level could be associated with the need
of local governors to adjust the budget. For example, Governor Wilson of California pressed 21
government employee unions in 1991 to accept a 5% pay cut because the state was especially
hard hit by the 1990-91 recession.8 As long as this reaction does not constitute a systematic
response to recessions, we conclude that confronting the identied shock series and real events,
our identication strategy is successful in extracting meaningful public employment and wage
shocks.
Additionally, we calculate the forecast error variance decomposition of private output and
the public wage bill at the di¤erent government levels. The two public wage bill shocks at any
government level explain together approximately 20-23% of private output at business cycle
8See Bureau of National A¤airs (1991).
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frequencies. On the other hand, the public wage bill shocks at the S&L level explain around
24% of public wage bill uctuations, while the federal wage bill shocks explain 29% of public
wage bill uctuations. Moreover, public wage and employment shocks share equal roles in
inducing business cycle uctuations at any government level.9
2.4.2 Impulse response functions and multipliers
In Figure 4 we present the responses of output and its components, employment and the real
wage in the private sector, as well as the unemployment and labor force participation rates,
and also responses of tax revenues and the other spending components to the two scal shocks
under investigation for the two government levels considered. For comparability purposes,
employment and wage shocks are scaled to represent a 1% of GDP increase in the government
wage bill.10 Each graph presents median estimates (solid line) and pointwise 68% credible bands
(dashed lines).
According to Figure 4, the shock to government employment signicantly increases private
output at both the federal and the S&L level. The timing of responses seems di¤erent: output
increases signicantly in the short run for shocks to government employment at the federal
level and with a lag at the S&L level. Also, private consumption increases signicantly after
an increase of government employment at the S&L level, while it does not move after the
same shock at the federal level. Similarly, private investment does not react signicantly in
the short run after a sudden increase in federal employment, while it falls and then increases
with a considerable lag after an increase in S&L government employment. Private employment
responses track both quantitatively and qualitatively the responses of private output, while
private wages increase in a more pronounced way to shocks to S&L government employment. As
before, the combined increase in private employment and the labor force participation renders
the responses of unemployment insignicant. On the other hand, all scal variables seem to
react insignicantly to the public employment shock at the federal level, but they may react
with one or more lags at the S&L level.11 Above all, government employment shocks have
9In the online Appendix, we present graphs for the forecast error variance decomposition of private output
and the public wage bill. Our estimates are in line with the ones reported in the existing literature.
10As in Perotti (2014), the responses to government employment (wage) shocks are divided by the initial
response of government employment (wage), and further divided by the sample mean ratio of the government
wage bill to GDP. In other words, this scaling refers to an increase in the wage bill induced only by the shocked
wage bill component, as if the other component was kept xed.
11The fact that we have orthogonalized the shocks does not mean that the respective shocked scal instruments
cannot react to each other contemporaneously or with a lag. In the next subsection, we investigate the sensitivity
of our results in other VAR specications that result to insignicant reactions of the rest scal variables to the
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expansionary e¤ects at the S&L level and, if any, only mildly expansionary impact at the
federal level.
Shocks to the public wage at the federal level induce a signicant drop in private output,
employment and (almost) investment, and a signicant surge in unemployment, while shocks
to the S&L government wages induce signicant increases in private output, consumption and
investment, a signicant and persistent increase in private wages and no signicant e¤ects on
private employment, unemployment and labor force participation. These di¤erential economic
e¤ects are also reected in the responses of tax revenues, which fall signicantly after shocks
to federal public wages but increase signicantly after shocks to S&L government wages. The
rest of the scal variables are not a¤ected signicantly by the public wage shock at the federal
level. At the S&L level, government wage increases induce signicant and persistent increases
in government investment and tax revenues.
The di¤erence in the impulse responses translates into di¤erences in the scal multipliers.
Table 2 presents point estimates of the impact output multipliers and the present-value cu-
mulative multipliers up to ve years after the shock. Multipliers are computed according to
Mountford and Uhlig (2009). The exact formula is presented in Appendix C. In parenthesis we
report 68% credible sets for the computed multipliers. A 1% of GDP increase in the government
wage bill induced by a shock to federal government employment implies a signicant expansion
of private output by 0.59% and 0.92% on impact and one year after the shock, respectively. On
the contrary, a 1% of GDP increase in the government wage bill induced by a shock to federal
government wages implies a contraction in private production by -1.22% and -0.59% one and
two years after the shock, respectively. Finally, at the S&L level, multipliers are positive and
signicant for both shocks on impact and at later horizons. As noted earlier, multipliers at the
S&L level for government employment shocks are signicantly higher than at the federal level.
In the online Appendix, we include the impulse responses following shocks to total gov-
ernment employment, dened as the sum of federal and S&L government employment, and to
the total government wage, dened as the average of the federal and S&L government wage
rates. Given the important di¤erences observed at the two di¤erent government levels, it does
not come as a surprise that adding the two results in mostly non-signicant e¤ects. At the
aggregate level, government wage shocks imply insignicant output multipliers, while a 1% of
GDP increase in the government wage bill induced by a shock to government employment raises
output by 1.34% on impact.
identied scal shock.
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2.5 Robustness
2.5.1 Controlling for all government levels
When identifying shocks to the federal or S&L public wage component one may worry that
such shocks are correlated. Increases in the wages of federal employees might correlate with
increases in the wages of public employees at the S&L level, for instance. Our benchmark results
conrm this for some of the VARs considered. To check the sensitivity of our results to the
possible correlation of shocks to federal and local government wage bill spending, we repeat the
estimation now controlling for the co-existence of federal and S&L shocks in the same VAR. In
other words, when identifying federal (S&L) government shocks we further require the shocks
to be orthogonal to a generic S&L (federal) government spending shock. We use the same VAR
model enhancing it with an extra variable that stands for either the federal or S&L government
expenditure. The extra shock to federal (S&L) government spending is identied by making it
orthogonal to all the rest of shocks, and further requiring federal (S&L) government spending
to increase for quarters k = 0, 1, 2, 3 after the shock. Figure 5 shows the impulse responses to
federal and S&L government spending shocks, while the middle panel of Table 2 presents the
respective output multipliers. As can be easily seen, results remain unchanged: government
employment shocks remain robustly expansionary at both government levels, and have higher
e¤ects at the S&L level. S&L government wage increases also expand output and employment
in the private sector, while federal wage increases have contractionary e¤ects. Multipliers are
also comparable.
2.5.2 An alternative identication scheme
Another robustness exercise is related to the identication scheme used to extract the scal
shocks. In particular, we repeat our VAR analysis extracting the scal shocks using a simple
recursive (Choleski) identication (Blanchard and Perotti (2002)). We keep the same ordering
of the variables as it is stated in the benchmark VAR specication. Impulse responses to federal
and S&L shocks are presented in Figure 6. As in our benchmark specication, a public employ-
ment increase leads to a signicant expansion of private output, consumption and employment,
and a signicant increase in the participation rate. Those e¤ects hold across any government
level and are stronger at the S&L level, as before. Federal wage shocks induce contractionary
e¤ects on output and employment in the private sector, while S&L government wage shocks are
clearly expansionary, thus further conrming our benchmark conclusions. As demonstrated in
13
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Table 2 (bottom panel), the ranking and sign of the multipliers are similar to the ones obtained
when we use sign restrictions to recover the shocks.12
3 Theoretical analysis
In this section we develop a New Keynesian model with a public sector, search and matching
frictions, and endogenous labor force participation. We assume that a public good produced
in the economy provides both productive services to private sector rms and utility-enhancing
services to the representative household. There are three types of rms in the economy: (i) a
public rm that produces the public good, which is provided for free (ii) private competitive
intermediate rms that use private inputs and the public good to produce a nal good; (iii)
monopolistic competitive retailers that use all intermediate varieties to produce the nal good.
Price rigidities arise at the retail level, while search frictions occur in the intermediate goods
sector. The households members consist of employees, unemployed, and labor force non-
participants. The government collects taxes and uses revenues to nance public expenditures,
the cost of new vacancies in the public sector and the provision of unemployment benets.
3.1 The model
3.1.1 Labor markets
In each period, jobs in each sector j = p, g (i.e. private/public) are destroyed at a constant
fraction σj and a measure mj of new matches are formed. The evolution of employment in each
sector is thus given by:
njt = (1− σ
j)njt−1 +m
j
t (1)
where we assume that matches become productive in the same period. The government, upon
forming a match, makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to matched workers. We also assume that
σp > σg in order to capture the fact that, relatively speaking, the public sector is characterized
by greater job security.13 We consider search as being random and so there is one matching
12Results also hold when we change the ordering of the VAR, and they are available from the authors upon
request.
13According to CBO estimates for the period 2005-2010, wages were on average higher for workers in the
federal government than for private-sector workers (Falk (2012)).
14
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
function that has unemployment, ut, and the total number of vacancies, υ
p
t and υ
g
t , as inputs:
mpt +m
g
t = ρm(υ
p
t + υ
g
t )
αut
1−α (2)
where the matching e¢ciency is given by ρm. We also assume equal vacancy lling probabilities
in the two sectors:
υgt
υpt
=
mgt
mpt
(3)
3.1.2 Households
The representative household consists of a continuum of innitely lived agents. The members
of the household derive utility from leisure, which corresponds to the fraction of members that
are out of the labor force, lt, and a consumption bundle, cct, dened as:
cct = [α1(ct)
α2 + (1− α1)(y
g
t )
α2 ]
1
α2
where ygt denotes a public good, taken as exogenous by the household, and ct is private con-
sumption. The instantaneous utility function is given by:
U(cct, lt) =
cc1−ηt
1− η
+ Φ
l1−ϕt
1− ϕ
where η is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, Φ > 0 is the relative
preference for leisure, and ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The elasticity
of substitution between the private and public goods is given by η
1−α2
.14
At any point in time, a fraction njt of the household members are employed in sector j = p, g
(i.e. private/public). Following Ravn (2008), the labor force participation choice is modelled as
a trade-o¤ between the cost of giving up leisure and the prospect of nding a job. In particular,
the household chooses the fraction of the unemployed actively searching for a job, ut, and the
fraction which are out of the labor force and enjoying leisure, lt, so that:
nt + ut + lt = 1 (4)
14When this elasticity is greater than one, ct and y
g
t are substitutes, while when it is below one, they are
complements. The Cobb-Douglas specication is obtained when the elasticity is equal to zero.
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where nt = n
p
t + n
g
t . The household owns the private capital stock, which evolves over time
according to:
kpt+1 = i
p
t + (1− δ
p)kpt −
ω
2

kpt+1
kpt
− 1
2
kpt (5)
where ipt is private investment, δ
p is a constant depreciation rate and ω
2

k
p
t+1
k
p
t
− 1
2
kpt are
adjustment costs. The intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
ct + i
p
t +
Bt+1πt+1
Rt
≤ [rpt − τ k(r
p
t − δ
p)]kpt + (1− τn)(w
p
tn
p
t + w
g
tn
g
t ) +̟ut +Bt +Π
p
t + Tt (6)
where πt ≡ pt/pt−1 is the gross ination rate, w
j
t , j = p, g, is the real wage in each sector, r
p
t is
the real return on capital, ̟ denotes unemployment benets, Bt is the real government bond
holdings, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate, Π
p
t are the prots of the monopolistic retailers,
discussed below, and τ k, τn, Tt represent taxes on private capital, labor income and lump-sum
transfers, respectively. The households rst order conditions and the expected marginal value
to the household of having an additional member employed in the private sector are reported
in Appendix D.
3.1.3 Production
Intermediate goods rms Intermediate goods are produced with a Cobb-Douglas technol-
ogy:
ypt = (ε
A
t n
p
t )
1−ψ(kpt )
ψ(ygt )
ν (7)
where εAt is an aggregate technology shock, k
p
t and n
p
t are private capital and labor inputs, and
ygt is the public good used in production, taken as exogenous by the rms. The public good is
provided for free. The parameter ν regulates how the public input a¤ects private production:
when ν is zero, the government good is unproductive.
Since current hires give future value to intermediate rms, the optimization problem is
dynamic and hence rms maximize the discounted value of future prots. The number of
workers currently employed, npt , is taken as given and the employment decision concerns the
number of vacancies posted in the current period, υpt , so as to employ the desired number of
workers, npt . Firms also decide the amount of the private capital, k
p
t , needed for production.
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The problem of an intermediate rm consists of choosing kpt and υ
p
t to maximize:
Qp(npt , k
p
t ) = max
k
p
t ,υ
p
t

xty
p
t − w
p
tn
p
t − r
p
t k
p
t − κυ
p
t + Et

Λt,t+1Q
p(npt+1, k
p
t+1)
	
(8)
where xt is the relative price of intermediate goods, κ is a utility cost associated with posting
a new vacancy, and Λt,t+1 =
βsUct+s
Uct
is a discount factor. The maximization takes place subject
to the private employment transition equation:
npt = (1− σ
p)npt−1 + ψ
fp
t υ
p
t (9)
The rst-order conditions are:
xtψ
ypt
kpt
= rpt (10)
κ
ψfpt
= xt(1− ψ)
ypt
npt
− wpt + EtΛt,t+1[(1− σ
p)
κ
ψfpt+1
] (11)
According to (10) and (11) the value of the marginal product of private capital should equal
the real rental rate and the marginal cost of opening a vacancy should equal the expected
marginal benet. The latter includes the marginal productivity of labor minus the wage plus
the continuation value, knowing that with probability σp the match can be destroyed.
The expected value of the marginal job for the intermediate rm, V Fnpt is:
V Fnpt ≡
∂Qp
∂npt
= xt(1− ψ)
ypt
npt
− wpt +
(1− σp)κ
ψfpt
(12)
Retailers There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by i on the
unit interval. Retailers buy intermediate goods and di¤erentiate them with a technology that
transforms one unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods, and thus the relative
price of intermediate goods, xt, coincides with the real marginal cost faced by the retailers. Let
yit be the quantity of output sold by retailer i. The nal consumption good can be expressed
as:
yt =
Z 1
0
(yit)
ǫ−1
ǫ di
 ǫ
ǫ−1
17
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
where ǫ > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand for retail goods. The nal good is sold at a
price pt =
hR 1
0
p1−ǫit di
i 1
1−ǫ
. The demand for each intermediate good depends on its relative price
and on aggregate demand:
yit =

pit
pt

−ǫ
yt
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in any given period each retailer can reset its price
with a xed probability (1− χ). Hence, the price index is given by:
pt =

(1− χ)(p∗t )
1−ǫ + χ(pt−1)
1−ǫ
 1
1−ǫ (13)
Firms that are able to reset their price choose p∗it so as to maximize expected prots given by:
Et
∞X
s=0
χsΛt,t+s(p
∗
it − p
x
t+s)yit+s
The resulting expression for p∗it is:
p∗it =
ǫ
ǫ− 1
Et
P
∞
s=0 χ
sΛt,t+sp
x
t+syit+s
Et
P
∞
s=0 χ
sΛt,t+syit+s
(14)
3.1.4 Wage bargaining
Wages are determined by ex post (after matching) Nash bargaining. Workers and rms split
rents and the part of the surplus they receive depends on their bargaining power. If we denote
by ϑ ∈ (0, 1) the rms bargaining power, the Nash bargaining problem is to maximize the
weighted sum of log surpluses:
max
w
p
t

(1− ϑ) lnV Hnpt + ϑ lnV
F
npt
	
where V Hnpt and V
F
npt have been dened above. The optimization problem leads to the following
solution for wpt :
wpt = (1− ϑ)[xt(1− ψ)
ypt
npt
+
(1− σp)κ
ψfpt
ψhpt ] +
ϑ
(1− τn)λc,t
(Φl−ϕt − (1− σ
p)λn,t) (15)
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Hence, the equilibrium wage is the sum of the value of the marginal product of employment
and the value to the rm of the marginal job multiplied by the hiring probability, weighted by
the workers bargaining power, and the outside option of being unemployed, weighted by the
rms bargaining power.
3.1.5 Government
The government sector produces the public good using public capital and labor:
ygt = (ε
A
t n
g
t )
1−(kgt )
 (16)
where we assume that TFP shocks, εAt , are not sector specic and  is the share of public
capital. The government holds the public capital stock. Similar to the case of private capital,
the government capital stock evolves according to:
kgt+1 = i
g
t + (1− δ
g)kgt −
ω
2

kgt+1
kgt
− 1
2
kgt (17)
Government expenditure consists of government consumption, modelled as a waste, public
investment, public wage payments, public vacancy costs, unemployment benets, and lump-
sum transfers, while revenues come from the capital and labor income. The government decit
is therefore dened by:
DFt = c
g
t + i
g
t + w
g
tn
g
t + κυ
g
t +̟ut − TRt
where TRt ≡ (w
p
tn
p
t + w
g
tn
g
t ) + τ k(r
p
t − δ
p)kpt − Tt denotes tax revenues net of transfers. The
government budget constraint is given by:
Bt +DFt = R
−1
t Bt+1πt+1
To ensure determinacy of equilibrium and a non-explosive solution for debt (see e.g. Leeper
(1991)), we assume a debt-targeting rule of the form:
Tt = T exp(ζß(ßt − ß)) (18)
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where ß is the steady state level of debt to GDP ratio, ßt =
Bt
yt
. If Ψg = υg, wg, cg denotes the
di¤erent scal instruments, we assume scal rules of the form:
Ψgt = Ψ
g  
Ψgt−1
̺ψg exp(εψgt ) (19)
where εψ
g
t is a zero-mean, white-noise disturbance, and ρ
ψ
g determines the persistence of the
di¤erent processes.
3.1.6 Monetary policy
There is an independent monetary authority that sets the nominal interest rate as a function
of current ination according to the rule:
Rt = R (Rt−1)
̺R exp(ζππt + ε
R
t ) (20)
where εRt is a monetary policy shock and πt measures ination in deviation from the steady
state.
3.1.7 Resource constraint
Private output must equal private and public demand. The resource constraint is given by:
ypt = c
p
t + i
p
t + c
g
t + i
g
t + κ(υ
p
t + υ
g
t ) (21)
3.2 Calibration
We solve the model by linearizing the equilibrium conditions around a non-stochastic steady
state in which all prices are exible, the price of the private good is normalized to unity, and
ination is zero. We calibrate the model for the U.S. at a quarterly frequency. Table 3 shows
the key parameters and steady-state values targeted in our calibration.
We calibrate the labor force participation and unemployment rate to match the observed
average values. Thus, we set labor force participation, 1-l ≡ n + u, equal to 65% and the
unemployment rate to 6.5%. We x the separation rate in the public sector σg = 0.045 and
in the private sector σp = 0.05, which is comparable with the estimates for the job separation
rate in Hobijn and Sahin (2009). We x the probability of lling a vacancy and then we use
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it to derived steady-state vacancies in each sector (υj = mj/ψfj). We use the value ψfp = 0.4,
which allows us to obtain meaningful values for vacancies (υp = 0.064, υg = 0.011). For the
matching elasticity with respect to vacancies we use a = 0.6. Hiring probabilities for each sector
are computed as the ratio of sector-specic matches to unemployed jobseekers.
The capital depreciation rates, δg and δp, are set equal to 0.025. Following the literature, we
set the discount factor β = 0.99, which implies a quarterly real rate of interest of approximately
1%. The elasticity of demand for retail goods, ǫ, is set such that the gross steady state markup,
ǫ
ǫ−1
, is equal to 1.25, and the price of the nal good is normalized to one. The TFP parameter,
A, is normalized to one. For the capital share in the private sector production function we
assume a standard value ψ = 0.36, and in the public sector production function we use  = 0.1.
We set the capital ratio kg/kp = 0.31 using data from Kamps (2006).
We set the replacement rate ̟
wp
= 0.45, following Brückner and Pappa (2012). Steady-state
tax rates are calibrated to the values in Traum and Yang (2015), which are mean values from
U.S. data over the period 1983-2008. The ratio of public consumption to output is set equal
to 6%, according to the mean value in our data. The steady state debt-to-GDP ratio takes
the value ßt = 60% annually. In absence of a consensus on the magnitude of this coe¢cient in
the literature, with estimates ranging from 0.39 to 0.56 in Aschauer (1989) for the elasticity of
output with respect to public capital to lower values in Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992) or even
zero in Holtz-Eakin (1994), we set ν = 0.15 and perform sensitivity analysis on this parameter
in Section 3.5, where we show that our results do not depend on the choice of this parameter.
We set α1 = 0.95 for the share of private consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle
of the household. Regarding the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution, η, much of
the literature cites the econometric estimates of Hansen and Singleton (1983), which place it
"between 0 and 2". In our calibration, we set η = 0.5. Following the literature on Edgeworth
complementarity between private and public consumption goods (see, e.g., Bouakez and Rebei
(2007), Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004), Fève et al. (2013)), we set α2 = −1.95, which implies
elasticity of substitution between the private and public goods given by η
1−α2
equal to -0.5. The
inverse of the Frisch elasticity, ϕ, is set equal to 1.5, in the range of Domeij and Floden (2006).
Finally, the models steady state is independent of the degree of price rigidities, the monetary
policy rule, and the size of the capital adjustment costs. Capital adjustment costs are included
to moderate the response of investment with respect to scal shocks. We set the ination
targeting parameter in the Taylor rule ζπ = 1.5, the capital adjustment costs parameter ω = 1,
and the price-stickiness parameter χ = 0.75.
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3.3 Results
In Figure 7 we present impulse response functions to a 1% of steady state output increase
in the public wage bill induced by an increase in public vacancies (top panel) and in public
wages (bottom panel).15 All responses are expressed in percentage deviations from respective
steady state values, with the exception of the unemployment and labor force participation
rates that are expressed in absolute percentage points. We rst report the results of our
benchmark parameterization (solid lines) for which public wage shocks have contractionary
e¤ects on private sector production in the short run. We then investigate which are the key
elements of the model that can account for the case of positive output e¤ects, as found for S&L
government wage shocks.
The predictions of our theoretical model match well the empirical evidence for public em-
ployment shocks (see Figure 7 (top panel)). It can be readily seen that this type of shocks to
the government wage bill is expansionary for the private sector by crowding in consumption and
increasing labor force participation and employment. In particular, the complementarity of the
public good with private consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle of the household
overturns the negative wealth e¤ect of the shock and leads to an increase in private consumption
(after the impact period). The unemployment rate rises due to the increase in labor market
participation.
Our model can also explain how government wage shocks can be contractionary or expan-
sionary, as found in the data, depending on the relative magnitude of the forces at play. More
specically, wage shocks lead to public-private wage spillovers, inducing a negative labor de-
mand e¤ect, which is reected in the response of private vacancies, and a fall in employment
in the private sector, as well as an increase in unemployment. At the same time, there is a
boost in the production of the public good as labor supply and employment in the public sector
increase. Consequently, public wage shocks can lead to a crowd in of private consumption given
the complementarity of the latter with the public good in the aggregate consumption bundle of
the household. These two opposite channels can help explain the empirical results. As we can
see in Figure 7 (bottom panel), with our benchmark calibration, we observe a short run con-
traction in private-sector production and a rise in the unemployment rate, which matches the
empirical evidence found for federal government wage shocks. In this case, the complementarity
channel is not su¢ciently strong to overturn the wage increase and the negative labor demand
15In the Online Appendix, we present responses for the other three shocks in the model, namely a government
consumption, a monetary policy, and a business cycle shock. The model does well in matching qualitatively the
responses in the empirical model.
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e¤ect in the private sector. We next examine whether increasing the degree of complementarity
between the public good and private consumption can generate an expansion in the private
sector, as observed in the data for S&L government wage shocks.
3.4 The complementarity between public and private goods
As already emphasized, the degree of complementarity between the public good and private
consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle of the household is key for determining
the e¤ects of government wage bill shocks. In this subsection, we investigate how varying
the degree of this complementarity a¤ects the transmission of both types of shocks to the
public wage bill. The dashed lines in Figure 7 (top panel) represent responses to a shock
in government vacancies when we increase the degree of complementarity between public and
private goods (by setting α2 = −3.9). As we can see, the e¤ects of government vacancy shocks
are signicantly more pronounced than in our benchmark calibration. This is line with the
empirical evidence for public employment shocks exhibiting stronger e¤ects at the S&L level
relative to the federal level. Turning to the public wage shocks (see Figure 7, bottom panel), with
a higher complementarity between public and private goods, the increase in private consumption
becomes larger, and the fall in private employment becomes smaller and short-lived, and so does
the rise in the private wage. The increase in public employment and output leads now to an
expansion in private-sector production.
Our theoretical analysis therefore suggests that the degree of complementarity with private
consumption at the S&L and federal level is key for explaining the observed heterogeneity to
wage bill shocks.16 The di¤erential macroeconomic e¤ects of public wage shocks can be justi-
ed by the di¤erent nature of the public good provided in each government level. For instance,
federal government employees largely comprise military employees, and even one-third of the
federal civilian workforce are employed in the Department of Defense.17 On the other hand,
S&L government employees provide mainly education, health care and transportation services.18
16As pointed out by a referee, preferences with complementarity of hours and consumption would in principle
allow us to t the increase in private activity after an increase in government employment, but this would go
against the federal and S&L distinction.
17Falk (2012) provides detailed information on the occupational tasks of the federal civilian workforce: 57%
of this workforce worked at three departments in 2010: (i) the Department of Defense employs more than one-
third; (ii) the Department of Veterans A¤airs employs 14%; (iii) the Department of Homeland Security employs
8%. Another 40% of federal civilian employees work for the other departments and agencies of the executive
branch, while the remaining 3% is employed by the legislative and judicial branches of government.
18As reported by McNichol (2012), by far the largest share of S&L government workers in 2010 were the
nearly 7 million teachers and support sta¤ working in the nations schools. Other important categories of S&L
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Research by Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) with European data has indeed shown that the de-
gree of complementarity between government and private consumptions is not homogeneous
over types of public expenditures. In particular, they nd that while some categories of public
spending seem to be substitutable with private consumption, there are also public expenditure
categories which are complements to private spending. More importantly, they report that the
latter case of complementarity seems to be the stronger relation, such that overall government
and private consumption are complements in the aggregate. Merit goods, including health and
education, complement private consumption while public goods, referring to defense, public
order and justice, are substitutes with private consumption. Bouakez and Rebei (2007) further
note that examples of public goods that are highly complementary with private consumption
include education and transportation. This idea is in line with recent work by Perotti (2014)
who shows that defense spending shocks in a SVAR generate contractionary responses, while
civilian government spending shocks generate large expansionary responses. The theoretical
explanation provided in that paper is based on the assumption that civilian spending exhibits
Edgeworth complementarity with private consumption, while defense spending is a waste. In
a similar vein, Pieroni and Lorusso (2015) present VAR estimates for the U.S. economy show-
ing that government civilian expenditure induces a positive response on private consumption,
whereas military spending has a negative impact.
3.5 Sensitivity analysis: The importance of complementarity against
other possible hypotheses
The previous subsection has highlighted that the model can explain the heterogeneity of re-
sponses of the empirical model at the di¤erent government levels if one accepts the idea that
public goods at the S&L level are merit goods, while the goods produced at the federal level
are public goods, according to the terminology adopted in Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004). Yet,
there are many characteristics in the model that could potentially explain the di¤erences in
results at the di¤erent government levels. For example, one might ask whether the presence of
the public good in the production function of the private sector could be an alternative channel
that can explain the mixed sign of the output response for public wage shocks. Also, vacancy
lling probabilities in the public sector at the S&L level might di¤er from those at the federal
employment are protective services (including police o¢cers and re ghters), higher education, health care,
and transportation (including road maintenance workers and bus drivers).
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level, or simply the level of income taxes might di¤er at the two government levels and this
could explain the di¤erences in responses.
In order to control for all those possible hypotheses and to validate the prediction of our
DSGE model concerning the role of complementarity between public output and private con-
sumption in explaining the heterogeneity of empirical responses, in this section following Leeper
et al. (2015) we resort to a sort of prior predictive analysis. What we are looking for here is
to establish that the degree of complementarity between private consumption and public good
is the key for explaining the di¤erences in S&L and federal responses even when we allow for
variations in other parameters of the model that could also be important in explaining the dif-
ferences. Our prior predictive analysis produces the entire range of the models possible impulse
responses when we change parameters that could di¤er at the S&L and federal level and can
shed light on our models predictions to confront with the data.
Formally speaking, let h(yt(θ|xt))) be a J × 1 vector of functions of the data yt produced by
the model, when the N × 1 vector of structural parameters θ is employed, conditional on the
shock xt. We let θ be uniformly distributed over Θ , where Θ =
Q
iΘi is the set of admissible
parameter values and Θi is an interval for each parameter i. We draw θ
l
i, i = 1, . . . , N from each
Θi, construct h(yt(θ
l|xt))) for each draw l = 1, . . . , 10000 and order them increasingly. Then we
report the 84 and 16 percentiles of the simulated distribution of h(yt(θ|xt))), where h(.) stands
for the models impulse responses when we vary the related parameters. Since the 68% bands
of the IRFs track well the responses in the empirical model and are signicantly di¤erent when
we change only the complementarity degree of the public good with private consumption in
the utility specication, we conclude that the value of the degree of complementarity is key for
explaining the empirical results.
We restrict the range of Θi on the basis of theoretical and practical considerations and
draw uniformly from these ranges. This way our approach also formalizes, via Monte Carlo
methods, standard sensitivity analysis conducted in many calibration exercises. We split the
parameter vector θ = (θ1, θ2), where θ1 represents the parameters which are xed to a particular
value, either to avoid indeterminacies or because of steady state considerations, while θ2 are
the parameters which are allowed to vary between the two government levels. Table 3 gives the
ranges for the parameters in θ2.
The vector θ1 includes the discount factor, the steady state TFP level, the debt to GDP ratio
and the risk aversion parameter. The intervals for the parameters that vary in our robustness
exercise are centered around the benchmark calibrated values. For example, we allow the
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vacancy lling probabilities in the private and public sector to vary in the [0.3,0.5] interval.
The share of public employees in total employment is much smaller in the federal level than
in the benchmark calibration. For that reason when constructing our priors we allow this
papemeter to vary in the [0.5,0.18] interval. We assume also di¤erences in the unemployment
rate, the replacement rates, the job destruction probabilities of jobs at the S&L and federal level
and di¤erences in the matching e¢ciencies varying this parameter at the [0.45,0.65] interval.
The labor supply elasticity, which is crucial in determining the labor market responses to scal
shocks and may di¤er for federal versus S&L jobs, varies in the interval [0.25,1], which covers
well the range of existing estimates. The capital adjustment costs parameter shapes investment
responses to shocks and therefore indirectly a¤ects labor market dynamics. The chosen range
allows for small (̟=0.1) and large (̟=3) adjustment costs. We also vary private and public
capital depreciation rates. The parameter ν controls the interactions between public and private
goods in production. Depending on its value, an increase in government capital has large, or
small e¤ects on private output. Aschauer (1989) estimates the elasticity of output with respect
to public capital in a range from 0.39 to 0.56. Evidence from more recent studies, however,
suggests positive, but lower, values for ν both at national and at the regional level (see, e.g.,
Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992)). In our model we use public output rather than public capital
in the private production function, we choose for ν the range [0, 0.2], which covers both the
case of unproductive government output and most of the estimates for the elasticity of output
to changes in public capital in the literature. We vary the productivity of public capital at the
[0,0.3] range and the public to private capital ratio between [0.25,0.35].
The degree of price stickiness and the coe¢cient on ination in the policy rule determine
both the shape and the size of output and ination responses following a scal shock. Since
at the state level nominal price rigidities might be less severe than at the federal level and
their interaction with monetary policy might operate di¤erently, we post intervals both for the
degree of price stickiness as well as the ination coe¢cient in the Taylor rule. Notice that
the determinacy of equilibrium depends nonlinearly on the values of χ, ζπ and ζb, for that
reason the ranges of these parameters are truncated so as to guarantee determinacy. Finally,
the persistence of the government wage bill shocks is allowed to vary between [0,1,0.9].
We report the 68% condence of the model IRFs in Figure 8 when we consider high and
low values for the parameter α2 that determines the degree of complementarity between public
goods and private consumption. For low complementarity we assume the interval [-2,-0.5]
that implies CES elasticities between private and public goods in the range [0.16,0.33], while
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for high complementarity values we use the interval [-3,-5] which implies CES elasticities in
the range [0.08,0.13]. The graphs clearly indicate that even if we vary the parameters of the
rest of the model that could also be responsible for the di¤erential macroeconomic responses
at the S&L and federal level, still the complementarity between public output and private
consumption is key for explaining the pattern of empirical responses. Our analysis suggests
that a model that permits government output to complement private consumption for di¤erent
levels of unemployment or taxes at the S&L and federal level and persistence of scal shock and
for various values of the labor supply elasticity or productivity of public capital is capable of
explaining the positive output responses after a government wage shock and the high multipliers
of a government employment shock at the S&L level.
In Figure 8 output, employment and consumption responses to vacancy shocks when we
consider the range of strong complementarity are on average larger than in the case we con-
sider the low complementarity interval. On the other hand, the 68% condence bands for the
responses of output in Figure 8 are above zero when we consider strong complementarity and
below when the degree of complementarity we assume is low. A similar picture emerges for
the responses of private employment. The probability that output responses are positive after
a government employment shock for the range of low CES elasticity equals 0.93 and for high
CES elasticity this probability equals 0.97. For government wage shocks the probability of
obtaining positive output responses when the degree of complementarity assumes values in the
low interval is 0.04, while for the high complementarity interval the probability of obtaining
positive output multipliers is 0.88. Hence, the analysis of this section clearly indicates that the
degree of complementarity between private and public goods is key for explaining the observed
heterogeneity at the di¤erent government levels.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper estimated the macroeconomic e¤ects of public wage expenditures in the U.S. by
identifying shocks to public employment and public wages. The e¤ects of public wage shocks
are contractionary at the federal level and expansionary at the S&L level. On the other hand,
public employment shocks are expansionary at both government levels by crowding in private
consumption and increasing labor force participation and private-sector employment. Shocks
to S&L government wages lead to a similar crowd in of private consumption, while shocks to
federal government wages lead to public-private wage spillovers, inducing a negative labor de-
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mand e¤ect, a sharp fall in private-sector employment and an increase in unemployment. We
developed a stylized DSGE model with a public good providing both productive and utility-
enhancing services, search and matching frictions, and endogenous labor force participation,
which was able to explain the qualitative properties of the empirical evidence. The unique
feature that can explain theoretically the heterogeneity of macroeconomic responses to gov-
ernment wage and employment shocks at the S&L and federal level is the complementarity of
private and public goods. Empirical responses are compatible with the theoretical ones if one
is willing to accept that the public goods produced at the S&L level are stronger complements
with private goods relative to public goods produced at the federal level.
Our analysis therefore suggests that the public good provided at the federal level may
exhibit a di¤erent degree of complementarity with private consumption than that at S&L
level. This might be justied by the di¤erent nature of the public good provided in each case.
For instance, federal government employees largely comprise military and defense employees,
while S&L government employees provide mainly education, health care and transportation
services. Our work has a number of useful policy implications in the aftermath of the crisis
and the slow recovery in advanced countries. In particular, increases in public employment
can stimulate the private sectors employment, encourage labor force participation and private
demand. On the other hand, public wage policies could be expansionary only if the increases
in wages are associated with the production of those public goods that strongly complement
private consumption. Wage increases should target, for instance, employees that work in public
education or the public health system.
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APPENDIX
A Data denitions and sources
Government consumption: Consumption expenditures, Item 21, Table 3.2. (Federal Govern-
ment) - Item 23, Table 3.3. (S&L Governments) - Government Current Receipts and
Expenditures, Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Government wage bill: Compensation of general government employees, Item 15 (Federal Gov-
ernment) - Item 50 (S&L Governments), Table 3.10.5. Government Consumption Expen-
ditures and General Government Gross Output, Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Government non-wage consumption: Government consumption minus Government wage bill
Government investment : Item 41, Table 3.2. (Federal Government) - Item 39, Table 3.3.
(S&L Governments) - Government Current Receipts and Expenditures, Source: Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
Civilian government employment (Federal): All Employees: Government: Federal, CES9091000001,
Source: US. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Government employment (State and Local): Civilian government employment (Total) minus
Civilian government employment (Federal)
Government employment (Federal): the sum of Civilian government employment (Federal)
and Military employment
Military employment : Source: Rameys (2011) dataset
Government hourly wage rate: Series have been constructed using the NBER extracts of
the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups to generate the following: national-level,
quarterly data for two wage categories: (a) federal government, (b) S&L governments
(excluding from the sample workers that have never been full time and self-employed).
Hourly wages were obtained for all workers using weekly wages and dividing by hours
worked. We regressed for the repeated (monthly) cross section the log of hourly wage
 separately for each of the two categories  on socio-demographic variables (age group,
gender, race, and marital status). We also included dummies for each state. We ran
the regression at the monthly level and then calculated residuals for each month. We
averaged residuals by month and used the mid-quarter month to obtain quarterly data.
We seasonally adjusted the quarterly data using a seasonal ARIMA model and deated
using the U.S. CPI quarterly ination series.
Net (of transfers) tax revenue (Federal): Current tax receipts (Item 2) plus Contributions
for government social insurance (Item 11) plus Current transfer receipts (Item 16) minus
Current transfer payments (Item 22) minus Subsidies (Item 32), Table 3.2. Government
Current Receipts and Expenditures, Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Net (of transfers) tax revenue (State and Local): Current tax receipts (Item 2) plus Contri-
butions for government social insurance (Item 11) plus Current transfer receipts (Item
16) minus Current transfer payments (Item 24) minus Subsidies (Item 30), Table 3.3.
Government Current Receipts and Expenditures, Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Total output : Gross domestic product, Item 1, Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product, Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Private output : Total output minus Government wage bill.
Private consumption: Personal consumption expenditures of non-durables and services, Items
5+6, Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product, Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Private investment : Non-residential investment, Item 9, Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product,
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Private employment : All Employees: Private, CES0500000001, Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Private hourly wage rate: Series have been constructed using the NBER extracts of the CPS
Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups in the same manner as the series for public wages. We
use also alternative series for the private wage rate dened as Nonfarm Business Sector:
Real Compensation Per Hour, Source: U.S.. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Unemployment rate: Unemployment Rate, LNS14000000, Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Labor force participation: Constructed as the sum of government employment, private em-
ployment and the number of unemployed, divided by total population.
Ination rate: the quarterly growth rate of GDP deator
Interest rate: FED Funds Rate, Item: FEDFUNDS, Source: FRED.
GDP deator: Gross Domestic Product, Item 1, Table 1.1.4 Price Indexes for Gross Domestic
Product, Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Population: Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Item: LNU00000000, Source: U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
B VAR estimation method
We consider a N-variable VAR model of the following form:
Yt = B(L)Yt−1 + ut
ut ∼ N(0,Σ)
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The Maximum Likelihood Estimator for (B,Σ) is given by:
bB = (X ′X)−1X ′Y
bΣ = 1
T

Y −X bB′ Y −X bB
We assume that the prior and posterior distributions of (B,Σ) belong to the Normal-Wishart
family:
Σ−1 ∼ W(S−1/ν, ν)
vec(B) | Σ ∼ N(vec(B),Σ⊗N−1)
with E[Σ−1] = S−1. Proposition A.1 on p. 670 in Uhlig (1994) states that if the prior is
described by Bo, N0, S0 and ν0, then the posterior is described by BT , NT , ST and νT , where:
νT = T + ν0
NT = N0 +X
′X
BT = N
−1
T (N0Bo +X
′X bB)
ST =
ν0
νT
S0 +
T
νT
bΣ + 1
νT
( bB −Bo)′N0N−1T X ′X( bB −B0)
Following Uhlig (2005), we use a weak prior that sets N0 = 0, ν0 = 0, S0 and B0 arbitrary. Flat
priors give results that are robust to the reordering of the variables in the VAR.
C Algorithm for shock identication, derivation of IRFs
and multipliers
The shock identication follows the approach of Arias et al. (2014), who propose an algorithm
for making independent draws from a distribution over the base parameterization that satises
the zero restrictions (see Algorithm 3 in Arias et al. (2014)). For convenience of the reader, we
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summarize the basic steps of the algorithm and the subsequent steps for calculating impulse
response functions and scal multipliers.
Let n be the number of endogenous variables in the VAR and F (φ−1(B,Σ)) any func-
tion from the base VAR parameterization with dimensions nr × n that satises the condition
F (φ−1(B,Σ, Q)) = F (φ−1(B,Σ, In))Q, for any Q ∈ O(n). For instance, F (φ
−1(B,Σ)) can be a
set of impulse response functions or the structural representation matrices. In addition, let Zj
be a matrix zj × nr so that ZjF (φ
−1(B,Σ, Q))ej = 0, where zj is a number of zero restrictions
needed to be imposed on F (φ−1(B,Σ)), and ej is the j
th column of the identity matrix In. Then,
the algorithm is summarized as follows:
1. Draw (B,Σ) from the posterior distribution of the reduced-form parameters as specied
in the previous section.
2. Draw (x1,...,xn) independently from a standard normal distribution on R
n.
3. Set
Q =

N1N
′
1x1
kN ′1x1k
...
NnN
′
nxn
kN ′nxnk

where the columns of matrix Nj form an orthonormal basis for the null space of the
(j − 1 + zj)× n matrix
Mj =
"
N1N
′
1x1
kN ′1x1k
...
Ni−1N
′
j−1xj−1N ′j−1xj−1  ZjF (φ−1(B,Σ, In))′
#
for 1≤ j ≤ ns, where ns is the number of structural shocks considered.
4. Calculate the impulse responses that correspond to the orthogonal matrix Q and save
them if the sign restrictions are satised.
5. Repeat steps 2-4 for a number of M draws of orthogonal matrices Q.
6. Repeat steps 1-5 for a number of N draws from the posterior distribution of the VAR
parameters.
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7. For all draws accepted and saved, calculate impulse responses and scal multipliers. As
in Mountford and Uhlig (2009), scal multipliers are computed by dividing the present
value cumulative response of output, y, by the present value cumulative response of total
government spending, g, after a shock to each spending component, and nally dividing
by the average government spending-to-GDP ratio, g/y (see the formula below). The
discounting is based on the sample mean nominal interest rate, r.
Present value multiplier at horizon h =
Ph
j=0(1 + r)
−jyjPh
j=0(1 + r)
−jgj
1
g/y
8. Finally, extract the median and the 16th and 84th percentiles of the saved impulse responses
and output multipliers.
According to our benchmark identication, zero restrictions are only required to identify the
monetary policy shock and they are imposed on the structural representation of the interest
rate equation. As a result, in our case F (φ−1(B,Σ, In)) collapses to the zero-lag structural
representation matrix. Furthermore, since the monetary policy shock is the second in order
shock identied, then Z2 is a non-empty matrix, while for the rest shocks with identication
order j = 1, 3− 7 the matrix Zj is empty.
D F.O.C. from the households problem
If we denote by λct, λnpt, λngt, λut the Lagrange multipliers, the rst-order conditions of the
households optimization problem are:
[wrt ct]
cc
(1−η−α2)
t α1(ct)
(α2−1) = λct (A1)
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[wrt Kpt+1]
λct

1 + ω

Kpt+1
Kpt
− 1

= βEtλct+1
(
1− δp + [rpt+1 − τ k(r
p
t+1 − δ
p)] +
ω
2
"
Kpt+2
Kpt+1
2
− 1
#)
(A2)
[wrt Bt+1]
λctπt+1 = βEtλct+1Rt (A3)
[wrt njt+1]
λnjt = βEt

λct+1(1− τ
n)wjt+1 + λnjt+1(1− σ
j)− Ul,t+1

for j = p, g (A4)
[wrt ut]
λnptψ
hp
t + λngtψ
hg
t + λct̟ = Ul,t (A5)
where Ul,t ≡ Φl
−ϕ
t is the marginal utility from leisure (labor market non-participation). Equa-
tions (A1)-(A3) are standard and include the arbitrage conditions for the returns to private
consumption, private capital and bonds. Equation (A4) relates the expected marginal value
from being employed to the after-tax wage, the utility loss from the reduction in leisure, and the
continuation value, which depends on the separation probability. Equation (A5) states that the
value of being search active (rather than non-participating), λct̟, plus the expected marginal
values of being employed, λnjt, weighted by the job nding probabilities, ψ
hj
t , should equal the
marginal utility from leisure, Ul,t. The expected marginal value to the household of having an
additional member employed in the private sector, V Hnpt, is given by:
V Hnpt = λct(1− τ
n)wpt − Ul,t + (1− σ
p)λnpt (A6)
According to (A6), V Hnpt has the following components: rst, the increase in utility given by the
real after-tax wage; second, the decrease in utility from lower leisure; third, the continuation
utility value, which depends on the separation probability: a private employee will continue
having the same job next period with probability 1− σp.
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Tables
Table 1: Sign restrictions on impulse responses
shocks
Restricted variables εn
g
t ε
wg
t ε
cg
t ε
ig
t ε
TR
t ε
MP∗
t ε
BC
t
Output +
Private consumption +
Private investment +
Ination rate
Interest rate
Government revenue + +
Government employment +
Government wage rate +
Government (non-wage) consumption +
Government investment +
Notes: All restrictions apply to 0-3 periods after the shock.
εngt : government employment shock, ε
wg
t : government wage shock, ε
cg
t : government consumption shock,
εigt : government investment shock, ε
TR
t : government revenue shock, ε
MP
t : monetary policy shock,
εBCt : business cycle shock
∗No restrictions on IRFs for the monetary policy shock. Identied through restrictions on the structural
representation coe¢cients of the interest rate equation (see Appendix C).
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Table 2: Private output multipliers
Benchmark VAR
Federal State & Local
Ng Wg Ng Wg
T=0 0.59 0.03 2.74 1.76
[0.07 1.04] [-1.86 0.60] [1.74 3.00] [0.86 2.26]
T=1 0.92 -1.22 1.07 2.34
[0.01 1.39] [-3.09 -0.05] [-2.69 2.40] [0.76 3.10]
T=2 1.02 -0.59 2.19 2.38
[-0.08 1.48] [-2.37 -0.10] [-1.38 3.60] [0.60 3.27]
T=3 1.00 0.19 3.09 2.38
[-0.21 1.55] [-4.08 4.98] [0.54 4.11] [0.49 3.43]
T=4 1.01 0.55 3.47 2.52
[-0.20 1.57] [-3.24 8.20] [1.36 4.46] [0.42 3.56]
T=5 0.99 0.66 3.52 2.69
[-0.35 1.57] [-2.81 7.89] [1.60 4.49] [0.30 3.77]
VAR, controlling for all government levels
Federal State & Local
Ng Wg Ng Wg
T=0 1.03 0.34 2.40 1.88
[0.23 1.36] [-1.30 1.37] [1.06 3.67] [0.62 2.11]
T=1 1.71 -0.37 0.97 2.63
[0.29 2.04] [-2.22 -0.03] [-2.15 2.32] [0.18 3.29]
T=2 1.83 -0.03 1.79 2.86
[0.49 2.43] [-4.33 7.72] [-1.81 3.07] [0.41 3.54]
T=3 1.90 0.43 2.55 2.97
[0.61 2.59] [-3.78 6.94] [0.16 3.54] [0.75 3.63]
T=4 1.96 0.88 2.87 3.06
[0.64 2.73] [-2.68 7.12] [0.32 3.81] [0.91 3.76]
T=5 1.97 1.05 2.96 3.16
[0.59 2.80] [-2.02 7.23] [0.49 3.95] [1.21 3.86]
VAR, Choleski identication
Federal State & Local
Ng Wg Ng Wg
T=0 1.05 -0.28 2.99 1.98
[0.63 1.44] [-1.09 0.34] [1.11 5.52] [1.13 3.15]
T=1 1.82 -2.44 0.75 3.00
[0.91 3.08] [-5.04 -0.58] [-0.99 2.58] [1.68 4.71]
T=2 2.02 -2.37 1.77 2.55
[0.92 3.84] [-6.83 -0.26] [-0.42 3.84] [1.06 4.24]
T=3 1.87 -1.52 3.05 2.38
[0.77 4.09] [-5.31 2.02] [0.68 5.05 [0.60 4.06]
T=4 1.68 -0.97 3.53 2.52
[0.44 3.95] [-4.55 2.68] [1.42 5.52] [0.06 4.31]
T=5 1.60 -0.71 3.53 2.78
[0.09 4.00] [-3.89 2.36] [1.51 5.39 [-0.19 4.83]
Note: Ng: Government employm ent sho ck, W g: Governm ent wage sho ck
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Table 3: Parameterization
Parameters Description Values Sensitivity Analysis
β discount factor 0.99 0.99
η risk aversion coe¢cient 0.5 0.5
α1 private consumption share in cc 0.95 [0.85,0.95]
α2 CES elasticity -1.95 [-2,-0.5] and [-3,-5]
ϕ inverse of Frisch elasticity 1.5 [1,4)
ν productivity of public goods 0.15 (0,0.2]
ψ productivity of private capital 0.36 [0.3,0.4]
 productivity of public capital 0.1 [0,0,3]
Kg
Kp
steady-state capital ratio 0.31 [0.25,0.35]
δj capital depreciation rate 0.025 [0.02,0.03]
ω adjustment costs parameter 1 [0.1,3]
χ price stickiness 0.75 [0.55,0.85]
ε
ε−1
steady-state markup 1.25 [1.1,1.4]
ψfp private vacancy lling probability 0.4 [0.3,0.5]
ψfg public vacancy lling probability 0.4 [0.3,0.5]
κ
wp
vacancy cost - wage ratio 0.045 [0.04,0.05]
u
1−l
unemployment rate 0.065 [0.06,0.08]
ng
n
public employment share 0.16 [0.05,0.18]
̟
wp
replacement rate 0.45 [0.4,0.5]
wg
wp
steady-state wage ratio 1.01 [1.005,1.015]
α matching elasticity 0.6 [0.45,0.65]
1− l labor participation rate 0.65 [0.6,0.7]
σg public separation rate 0.045 [0.045,0.06]
σp private separation rate 0.05 [0.045,0.06]
A steady-state TFP 1 1
ß debt to GDP ratio 0.6*4 2.4
τ k capital tax rate 0.2 [0.1,0.4]
τn labor tax rate 0.2 [0.1,0.4]
ζß debt coe¢cient -2 [-1,-4]
ζπ Taylors π coe¢cient 1.5 [1,2.5]
̺ψg persistence of shocks 0.8 [0.1,0.9]
̺R persistence of interest rate 0.65 [0.4,0.8]
Notes: j = p, g, ψ =υg, wg, cg
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Figures
(a) Historical Evolution
(b) Comparison with the other spending components
(as % of total spending)
(c) Disaggregation by government level
Figure 1: The government wage bill in the U.S. (Data source: BEA)
.
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Figure 2: The volatility in U.S. government expenditure series (in growth rates)
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Figure 3: The identied government employment and wage shocks
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(d) S&L Governm ents
Figure 4: Impulse responses to government employment and wage shocks
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Figure 4 (contd): Impulse responses to government employment and wage shocks
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(b) S&L Governm ents
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to government employment and wage shocks,
controlling for shocks at all government levels
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Figure 5 (contd): Impulse responses to government employment and wage shocks,
controlling for shocks at all government levels
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(d) S&L Governm ents
Figure 6: Impulse responses to government employment and wage shocks,
Choleski identication
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Figure 6 (contd): Impulse responses to government employment and wage shocks,
Choleski identication
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Figure 7a: Theoretical impulse responses to a rise in the public wage bill equal to 1% of GDP
induced by a shock to government employment
(solid lines: benchmark calibration, dashed lines: higher degree of complementarity)
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Figure 7b: Theoretical impulse responses to a rise in the public wage bill equal to 1% of GDP
induced by a shock to government wages
(solid lines: benchmark calibration, dashed lines: higher degree of complementarity)
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Figure 8: Sensitivity analysis,
Low complementarity (Figures (a) and (b)) against high complementarity (Figures (c) and (d))
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